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A Primer for the Constitutionally Impaired'
Marianne M. Jennings*
I. INTRODUCTION
It comes every June and I hate it. "It" is the month-long fest of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions. First, you read about them in the
Wall Street Journal 2, then Peter Jennings starts in,3 and finally the
Home Shopping Network joins in on the merriment.4
The Supreme Court gets a lot of attention for nine people who
won't even consent to be on the cover of People.' I know they're a
fine group of folks.' I just think they're overrated. They get all the
credit and all the June media attention. What about those of us
down in the trenches making reversible error and legislating void
for vagueness laws? Where would the Supreme Court be without
US?
7
Another problem I have with the Supreme Court is that I'm not
sure they have a grasp of the criminal justice system. The notion
1. That would be a person who is deficient in constitutional law. The author does
not imply that she has been declared constitutionally impaired, or impaired by the
Constitution in any way in the pursuit of life, liberty, or Phoenix Suns tickets.
* Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, College of Business, Arizona State University.
2. The headlines in the WSJ are not always pro-court-something like: "Those nine
jerks in muumuus once again refused to get rid of RICO."
3. The ABC headline for the case in note 2 would be: "Business was dealt yet an-
other blow today by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held today that ambiguous statutes
intended to regulate crosswalks could be applied to permit dismemberment of business peo-
ple who continue their relentless campaigns to turn a profit."
4. "Better buy this julienne fry-maker today, before the company is indicted under
RICO, because our Supreme Court just gave the go-ahead for RICO charges based on juli-
enne fries production as the predicate offense."
5. Okay, there was that Clarence Thomas cover, but, hey, look what happened to
him.
6. The only problem I ever had was Thurgood Marshall's white socks, and I know
they're explained post-mortem in his recently-released papers. Also, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
T-strap, Wizard-of-Oz-like shoes seem intimidating.
7. Probably still trying to figure which spelling of "marijuana" ("marihuana") to go
with. It was a split vote, one abstaining, three gave a proxy. No elaboration on possible
conflict was given for the abstention. See Thurgood Marshall's papers as reported in Tony
Mauro, Justice Tilted at Court's Windmills, USA TODAY, May 27, 1993, at 1A. And you
thought this wasn't going to be a scholarly piece. By the way, the final decision was for
"marijuana." For the spelling, not for indulging, legalizing, or exempting from RICO.
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the Court has seems to be that Mr. Rogers is pulled over outside
his neighborhood for turning right on red.8 I believe these justices
need to understand that most criminal defendants, with the excep-
tions of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, look like they have hair
comparable to Brillo (trademark lawyers avert your eyes) pads on
their shoulder blades and things like "My Father was Satan Him-
self" tattooed on their arms."
These justices need a little training in the trenches. I was think-
ing that if they just tuned into Cops on the Fox Network on Satur-
day evenings they could see why that Miranda v. Arizona ° case is
largely irrelevant since the crimes are committed on video tape for
the Fox camera guys." Confessions just aren't a critical part of law
enforcement, what with VCRs and all."
But my two biggest difficulties with the Supreme Court are its
decisions: a) They're too long; and b) Mostly I don't understand
them. And this is where this article comes in. This article is for
people who slept through McCulloch v. Maryland,13 who can't say
certiorari1 ' and who think free exercise is what you get when you
go to an open house for a new health club. If this were a true schol-
arly piece, right about here it would read: The purpose of this arti-
cle is to provide, for practical application, a historical perspective
8. The author does not imply that Mr. Rogers would ever do this. Hey, I've read
that New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), thing, and I'm not getting into a libel
suit with Mr. Rogers. Although I did hear once that King Friday shot a guy. Do puppets
qualify as public figures?
9. I actually don't have first-hand knowledge about Boesky's or Milken's shoulder
blades. King Friday told me.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This case was so important that two summers ago we even
had to celebrate its anniversary. See, we're even into Supreme Court reruns.
11. The only problem I see is those fuzzed out or blue-spotted heads on the tape.
Maybe Fox can fix that up for trial.
12. By the way, the Supreme Court has okayed taping Cops (and any other story for
that matter) in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Well, they
didn't say, "it's okay by us if you want to tape Cops from Fox 15." What they said was that
time-shifting (which is what we do when we record Cops while we're at the Bruce Lee movie
so that we can have a really big Saturday night) was not a copyright infringement under
federal copyright law. Whew, what a relief that is! Otherwise we all surely would have been
jailed for recording the Nick-at-Nite reruns of The Partridge Family series and the Beverly
Hillbillies Return. And we would have gone to jail tattooless but with Miranda warnings.
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This would usually be the first case in your Con
Law course because it is the case in which the Supreme Court ruled itself to be the Supreme
Court. It's a long harangue that basically says, "We're in charge. The laws and regs stop
here." They didn't say "buck" because there's something quite awful about money and judi-
cial connections.
14. Just say "cert." You'll either get your message across or be handed a breath mint,
depending upon how impaired, constitutionally speaking, those around you are.
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on the U.S. Supreme Court. 5
II. SPEAKING SUPREME COURT-USING THE LANGUAGE TO FOOL
OTHERS (THEY'LL THINK YOU'RE A CONSTITUTIONAL WONK)
Just think "bootstrapping." No one has ever gone wrong"e saying
something like "That's a bootstrap argument." Also learn to throw
around terms like rational basis, strict scrutiny, medium scrutiny,
rational scrutiny, reasonable scrutiny, reasonable rational, rational
strict, and rational bootstrap. "Chilling" is a key term. There is,
however, no such thing as chilling scrutiny. There is chilling effect
and chilling willing (formal name of that cartoon penguin "Chilly
Willy" who bears a remarkable resemblance to William Rehn-
quist).17 "Sua sponte," which is a distant cousin to "sui generis,"
is also critical for constitutional wonk discussions."
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION
In case you're ever on Jeopardy, this information might come in
handy. There are seven articles and twenty-seven amendments in
the U.S. Constitution.19 The articles set up the three branches of
government: executive, legislative and judicial. 0 There's also the
Supremacy Clause,21  the Contract Clause,2  the Commerce
15. Translation: the highlights of Con Law for those who never use it in practicing
law, and who believe the released Marshall papers depicting a bickering group of petty
backstabbers pretty much confirm what they thought all along: Supreme Court Justices are
as goofy as the rest of us. The author recognizes that, hailing from academe, she has a lot of
nerve using "bickering," "petty" and "backstabbers" to describe anyone outside the campus.
It's a pot calling the kettle black. Actually it's a goofy professor calling the justices goofy.
The Supreme Court is also a fine kettle of fish, a bull by the horns, and ducks in order. The
author was on a simile roll and felt compelled to list all of those, however irrelevant.
16. Speaking only in the constitutional sense of course.
17. Actually known as "Willy" or "Wills" Rehnquist to close associates and in the
Marshall Papers as "Silly Willy," companion to "Bootstrap Brennan," and "Scrutiny
Scalia."
18. This author notes by way of disclaimer that you should probably not say"sui" or
"sua" too loudly, particularly in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits due to hog stampede risk,
as those words have the opposite of a chilling effect on hogs.
19. If Alex Trebek gets really picky, or you hit the daily double, the Constitution was
ratified by 9 of the 13 colonies that participated in drafting it in 1788. 1.
20. There are, of course, now four branches of government: executive, legislative, ju-
dicial, and Senator Robert Dole.
21. Very easy concept: federal government wins.
22. Very easy concept: hasn't been used with any real results since 1905 in Lochner v.
United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The concept is pretty much ignored, except in law school.
It's important to know these obscure clauses for the bar exam so that you can pass the exam
and then never use the information again.
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Clause,2" the Santa Clause, the Nina, the Pinta and the Santa
Maria. 5
The first ten amendments to the Constitution are the Bill of
Rights.2" The Bill of Rights was the deal maker for the rest of the
Constitution.' Without the Bill of Rights, the Constitution would
have had a substantial BTU tax in Article IV.28 Here's a brief
overview:
First Amendment-The Right to Burn Flags.
2 9
No religion anywhere"0 except cable television. 1
Second Amendment-Drafted by the NRA.
2
Fourth Amendment-Warrants for fun and profit."
Fifth Amendment-Taking land to build Chrysler Plants. 4
23. Used to be a big deal, because states once believed the federal government
shouldn't regulate everything. Now if there's interstate commerce involved, Congress can
regulate it. Interstate commerce is involved if the regulation relates to a chicken in Illinois
and the chicken can scratch 1-10 in the dirt. So Congress can regulate anything it wants to
regulate (and some things it doesn't want to regulate, but it's habit-forming).
24. Inserted arbitrarily by this author as a test to see if anyone is still reading at this
point. Also, should this author ever be nominated for some federal job, such as Commerce
Clause Assistant Attorney General for Contracts and Supremacy, this little phrase alone
should get me a Lani Guinier-type appearance on Nightline. Probably Geraldo too.
25. In the interest of academic precision, there was another boat when Columbus
sailed the ocean blue in 1492, but I only learned three when I was in school and it wasn't on
the bar exam. Furthermore, revisionist history has taught us that Columbus was pond scum.
26. Some writers prefer, of course, the more formal William of Rights, cousin to Wil-
liam of Lading, and Wills of Attainder, a cousin to Wills of Rehnquist and also Wills of
Chuck and Di. Soon to be Chuck and Camilla Parker-Bowles and Di and ?.
27. Without some fundamentally interesting things like whether yelling "Fire" in a
crowded theater was constitutionally protected, there was no way that all that other sleep-
rendering stuff on justiciability would have garnered the necessary votes.
28. This is second-hand information from an ancestor of Senator "No-Energy-Tax"
Bowen of Oklahoma.
29. Fire has long been recognized as a form of speech. See, e.g., Nero.
30. Well, mostly they want to keep it out of high schools because it causes a loss of
Def Lepperd influence, and students begin to wear T-shirts that are not black with world
tour notations.
31. The cable television shows with Pastor Dave (who happens to wear black leather
suits) or Minister Marilyn (who does not), are permitted to counterbalance quality programs
like Oprah and Donahue. This counterbalancing is subject to strict scrutiny as well as
commercials.
32. The National Rifle Association (NRA) was formed at the Boston Tea Party.
Some original members and weapons remain today.
33. The profit comes under the RICO statutes that allow governmental agencies to
take even the Ovaltine from your cupboard when possessing property because you commit-
ted a crime; you were with Mr. Rogers when he turned right on red.
34. Known as eminent domain, the "Takings" Clause allows the government to take
your land, pay you a tad, and then build a freeway off-ramp on top of your bathroom. The
Fifth Amendment also contains the Due Process Clause. This means you must "do" process
before you take anything away, from food stamps to California coastal property.
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Sixth Amendment-Trials and other lawyer employment programs. 8
The rest of the amendments are never discussed. They were giveaways in
exchange for jus tertii.
3 6
Now there are some amendments beyond the first ten that we've
lopped3 7 on when things got testy. We had that drinking problem
for awhile, so we cut off supplies, and then reinstated the drinking
problem. 38 We had that revenue problem for awhile, so we got
taxes into place. 9 We still have that revenue problem, but the le-
gality of drinking seems to help."' There is the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 41 which basically says the states have to follow the rest of the
Constitution. Often called the Equal Protection Clause, the XIVth
Amendment has been a basis for every lawsuit filed since 1868.42
The 14th Amendment is also the due/do process clause for states. 3
So, there you have it. The Constitution looks like the original
Pong game. It was a simple game people felt comfortable with."
But we're now up to arcades, games with steering wheels, in-home
35. Everyone gets a trial. Even those guys who confess to the camera on Cops are
entitled to a trial.
36. Jus tertii is a form of Italian spumoni, and also is thrown around by the courts to
keep third parties from suing. This way chiropractors cannot go directly to court for pa-
tients in motor vehicle personal injury cases. They still have to wait for their injured but
"well-adjusted patients" to file suit.
37. Actually, the lopping is a pretty complex process. Congress has to agree on the
amendment and then we have to go to the frightening halls of state legislatures to get ap-
proval from a bunch of them.
38. These are amendments XVIII and XXI. And without them there never would
have been an Eliot Ness, or Tatum O'Neal's Oscar for Paper Moon-the inspiring story of
moonshining with a child in a convertible.
39. This Amendment is XVI in roman numerals. Due process is not required for
taxes.
40. I've heard. No original source here. My apologies to the BLUEBOOK Czars. The
BLUEBOOK is, of course, written by folks who enjoy constitutional law and drinking. There
are no due process rights under the BLUEBOOK. Your citation can be taken and changed
without notice and without just compensation.
41. XIV for you Thomas Jefferson purists.
42. The ACLU has a 14th Amendment "Windows" icon on its computer. Actually,
.the 14th Amendment was never mentioned in the savings and loan lawsuits brought against
auditors and directors for defunct institutions. They had a slam dunk, so it wasn't necessary
to invoke the XIVth Amendment.
43. As you will see later on (formally, see notes 187-227 and accompanying text), the
14th Amendment gets us into all that rational basis stuff. From there we move to strict
scrutiny. Then we plod into rational scrutiny and bootstrapping. These tests mean how
closely the Supreme Court is going to eyeball state legislation and how long the opinion will
be. Rational basis = "Hey, if the state wants to be this wacky, who are we to question?"
Strict scrutiny = "How are we going to evolve into historical figures if we don't chastise
these states on topics like contraception?"
44. Prepositional endings are acceptable under the rational basis standard.
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games and games with enough noise for a thermonuclear war.'
Now for the details. 6
IV. ARTICLE II
4
The purpose of Article II is to make sure the president doesn't
get out of control."" Presidents can negotiate treaties, 9 but the
Senate has to ratify them.50 Another power in Article II remains up
in the air and subject to great debate, but apparently presidents
can send in troops without Congressional approval.51
Presidents can veto.2 Presidents can issue pardons,53 but they
can be impeached for treason, bribery and high crimes and
misdemeanors.'
The only time anyone gets worked up about Article II is when
they would kind of like to impeach someone or cause national em-
barrassment on Nightline. I speak, of course, of the access to presi-
dential stuff.55 The real problem is you only get one or two of these
45. I'm not accusing the Supreme Court of being unduly noisy. However, the folks
who get worked up about "do process" can be quite vocal, especially when they end up on
Inside Edition.
46. This is where we get into the cases. You may regret it, but you're never going to
find a better treatise, in terms of simplicity and irreverence.
47. How's that for style? The fourth segment of this article covers Article II. So, it's
Part IV, Article II. Not to mention the fact that I skipped over Article I altogether. It's
coming. See notes 85-110 and accompanying text. We have to define the Supreme Court's
role before we can discuss its role in Article I. Bottom line: Article II precedes Article I.
48. Well, life and constitutions hold no guarantees, but Article II and the Supreme
Court have seen to it over the years that presidents don't end up like Saddam Hus-
sein-pretty much focusing on the war power and fairly oblivious to issues of due process in
everything from military desertion to wives and concubines.
49. Well, they send folks like Carla Hills and Mickey Kantor to negotiate for them.
Presidents are often busy in Hollywood.
. 50. See, e.g., NAFTA, which sat around the Senate while everyone else has just
started trading. See also GATT which is still sitting around the Senate. Sometimes, our
forefathers felt, you have to let people think they're in charge.
51. It's really irritating when one guy holds all the army figures.
52. Hey, but Congress can override.
53. Only for federal crimes, and former President Gerald Ford has stated that it's not
as much fun as it may appear to be on the surface, ever since he lost to Jimmy Carter
because he pardoned Richard Nixon.
54. One wouldn't think a Woody Allen movie would be a reason for impeachment.
But our forefathers knew best, and probably also knew that Mia Farrow would someday
land in one.
55. Presidential stuff would be things like 50 days of Nixon tapes on which he swears
a lot. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Or presi-
dential stuff would be things like the documents sent between the president and the head of
the EPA because the EPA was giving pollution breaks for cash. See, e.g., ANNE M. BURFORD,
ARE You TOUGH ENOUGH? (1988).
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cases until peopl get wise and quit writing stuff down and making
recordings.5 So, the Executive Branch just cranks along and
there's basically nothing new since Marbury v. Madison.17 In that
case, the Supreme Court said it could review acts of Congress."
V. ARTICLE III-HEY, WE'LL HEAR WHAT WE WANT TO HEAR
Under Article II, the Supreme Court established that it was in
charge. Not anticipating the workload of its czar status, the Court
had to come up with some rules for keeping folks away5" - enter
Article III.
Technically speaking, 0 Article III, Section 2 says the Supreme
Court"1 is supposed to hear "cases and controversies." In the inter-
est of keeping the work calendar running from October to May, the
Court developed some fancy ways of saying, "Hit the road."62 The
first fancy term is "justiciability." You hear it in Con Law over and
over again in variations such as "justiciable-quality," "quality of
justiciability" and "justifiable quality of justiciability.""3 You hear
56. Writing things down seems to be a death knell for any political aspirant. See, e.g.,
Lani Guinier and Robert Bork.
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This is the case where John Adams appointed a
bunch of people to offices before he left Washington. Marbury was one of them-he was
appointed to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, and was an un-
known outside the context of this Supreme Court case and being the now-deceased Marbury
man in TIME magazine ads in which he rode a horse, wore a cowboy hat and smoked
cigarettes.
New President Thomas Jefferson stepped in and told Madison (hey, there you have the
name of the case explained) not to appoint these hangers-on to their JP posts.
58. Basically the decision made the Supreme Court in charge of everything. With this
type of ruling, there wasn't much need for further refinement of the precedent. They did
issue one clarification. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the
Court added this clarification: "We're in charge of what state courts do too."
One may be wondering who these Wheat and Cranch fellows were in these early citations.
They were the clerks of the court (i.e., wrote the decisions) and with darn important jobs
like that, they just named the reporter systems after themselves. You see it today in the
Reporter family monopoly, to wit: Atlantic Reporter, Pacific Reporter, and the less market-
dominating Supplements family: New York Supplement and Fed. (Federal) Supplement.
The Gambinos and Corleones have been unsuccessful in taking over reporter systems, but
with John Gotti in jail, who knows what the future holds?
59. I think they've done a fairly decent job of making people stay away just by look-
ing so grumpy in those annual photos. This does not look like a group of people I'd want to
have a sack race with (again, authorized prepositional ending). And Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has the shoes and look of a third-grade teacher who's pretty fussy about penman-
ship. I hope she doesn't smack people with rulers from the bench.
60. Does the Supreme Court know any other methodology?
61. And its underling courts of the Supplement and Reporter families.
62. Which is the English translation of "Certiorari denied."
63. Also, there is rational justiciability and justiciability by bootstrapping.
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about it at length, but soon discover that the last case on jus-
ticiability was in 1947.64
Now, the Court has also been quite testy about standing6 6 The
first part of standing says that only the folks who are actually
harmed may show up to whine about constitutional issues . 6 It's
best to summarize standing as follows: taxpayers, in spite of their
actual payment of funds, have not enjoyed much success.61 But
success in the judicial sense has not come easily, because the Su-
preme Court's view is this: you can be taxed, and even if your tax
monies are used to help Charles pay Diana child support, there
isn't a whole lot you can do because we're not going to supervise
government spending just because you happen to be furnishing the
money for the spending.6 8
Standing is also an issue in non-taxpayer cases. In these cases
the Supreme Court has ruled you have to be injured and what
64. The case was Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549
(1947), and Justice Rutledge said, "no more advisory opinions by this court because judicial
restraint is important." Judicial restraint sounds like S&M, or as if we have to chain and
straight-jacket people in black robes whenever they hear U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Joycelyn
Elders speak. However, it just means the Court won't get involved unless Dr. Elders starts
impeachment proceedings, or sends troops to Switzerland. Are you like me? Are you won-
dering what the Rescue Army was and why they were fighting (the Municipal Court no less)
in Los Angeles in 1947? Look it up. It's not my job, even in the most trying of academic
pieces, to satisfy your idle curiosity.
65. Don't get me wrong. The Court does not have a problem with standing vs. sitting.
Although I have only seen Rehnquist stand once. And the last time I saw Sandra Day
O'Connor stand was on the steps of the Court with Reagan at her swearing-in, when her
dress was hanging out of her robes. I saw Clarence Thomas walking around his house once
before he was confirmed. And I think Ruth Bader Ginsburg was standing when Clinton
announced her nomination. She's very tiny, so it's hard to tell.
66. Without this limitation, Ralph Nader would be unrestrained and the Supreme





67. It's an economic theory. If you tax folks too much they give up on the whole
working-for-a-living theme.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), in which the Court
rejected a taxpayer's suit because the taxpayer wanted to know how the CIA was spending
its money. One thing one must wonder about these cases is what type of life and clothing
these folks who trek to the Supreme Court at the drop of a hat have. I mean I can pretty
much figure what the CIA expense books look like: microphones - $7 billion; shoe phones -
$1 million; assassins - $10 million (several billings still pending); and Denny's retaliation
(plans pending). Then you have Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974), in which the Supreme Court used the standing doctrine to avoid having to face
the Vietnam War. I guess one could say the Supreme Court collectively dodged the draft,
dodged the bullet and avoided a kettle of fish. Those sayings just keep on coming, eh?
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you're suing about (your injury) must have caused your injury.69
It is at this point that the concept of justiciability gets really
good, because the Supreme Court has developed four-letter words
for these portions of the whole justiciability thing: "moot" and
"ripe."7 Mootness means the case is over by the time it gets to the
Supreme Court. 1 Mootness was used for a time to duck the abor-
tion issue. 72 But along came Roe v. Wade73 and mootness became
ripe. 4
Moot means you're too late and ripe means you're too early.76 A
case is ripe if you've been fired, 76 choked,77 and actually surveil-
led.78 The threat of firing, choking or surveillance is enough for a
69. Seems like a simple enough concept, but leave it to nine humorless eggheads to
come up with exceptions: physicians have standing to sue to challenge a statute preventing
Medicaid payments for abortions (the physicians weren't having the abortions, but they also
weren't getting paid). Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); residents could challenge lia-
bility limitations for nuclear power plants even though they had no damage on a standing
exception based on the following: "If there were a problem at the nuclear plant, I can guar-
antee you my damages would be at least $560 million." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); and sellers who are trying to unload property with
racially restrictive covenants can sue on behalf of buyers to challenge the restrictions (saves
the buyers a ton in legal fees). Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
70. There was also Shemp, but he was later dropped from the act for not being as
funny as the other two, and Curly Joe was then added to complete the tripartite.
71. One can see why so few cases make it to an actual Supreme Court decision. Most
lawyers handling the cases that get to the U.S. Supreme Court die of old age sometime
between the court of appeals and cert. And these are the ones who were new members of the
bar at the time of the trial (i.e., had just taken the bar exam and successfully answered the
Contracts Clause question).
72. However, even with the elephant gestational period of 48 months, assuming an
elephant would have standing, it was going to be tough to find a non-moot, non-pachyderm
abortion case.
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. But there was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), in which a law student's
challenge to a minority admissions program was dismissed because his name was too goofy
to be spoken seriously in oral argument, and because the Court figured there would always
be some bored law student to pick up the gauntlet.
75. Supreme Court justiciability is a lot like bananas: there's a perfect time and little
margin for error on either side.
76. See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), in which federal
employees said they'd be sacked if they participated in a political campaign. The Supreme
Court said this: "Come see us after you've been sacked and we'll talk." It isn't an exact
quote and the opinion took 30 pages to say it, but the gist is correct.
77. In a surprising foreshadowing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983),
former chokehold victim and current criminal Cheeredon, in a suit brought, of course, on
behalf of all potential criminals and chokeholdees, requested that an injunction be issued
against the Los Angeles police, prohibiting chokeholds by police officers of said criminals
and chokeholdees. In a move I'll bet they're rueing even as I work, the Supreme Court said,
"Get choked first and then come see us for damages. Sooner or later L.A. will get the mes-
sage." It's 1994, Rodney King is free and the injunction is looking good.
78. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), the Supreme Court said the fear of surveil-
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mental breakdown but not enough for Supreme Court ripeness. 9
Now, there are other times when the Supreme Court is hesitant
to review things, and they throw around terms like comity.8° Also,
the Supreme Court pretty much likes to stay away from political
questions, except for apportionment,"1 districting, gerrymandering,
super majorities and a host of other voting schemes that forced
Lani Guiniers2 onto Nightline.
Now what do we learn from all this justiciability restraint? We
learn that the Supreme Court can pretty much decide what it
wants to decide and no one will be any wiser if the results seem
inconsistent. 4
VI. ARTICLE 185
Article I has proven to be a big help to Congress. 6
A. The Commerce Clause
Originally, the Commerce Clause 7 was put into the Constitution
to keep states from jamming up trade with their own picky laws. It
was not anticipated that Congress would step in and take over and
jam up trade on a national basis with its own picky laws.
88
lance and its chilling effect is not enough. They said, "Come back after you've been surveil-
led and we'll talk damages." Or did they say, "Come back after you're chilled and we'll talk"
or was it, "Come back and we'll bootstrap you."
79. Apparently, the Supreme Court likes to see the ending first for purposes of this
ripeness thing.
80. Not the Procter & Gamble cleanser. This restraint means state issues have to be
run by the state courts first. Nothing is really clear on comity-it's an opaque powder. See
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
81. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
and Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
82. At one time, President Clinton's nominee for head of the Civil Rights division of
the Justice Department and author of The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991). It seems that
political appointees need to stay away from political questions as well.
83. Koppel couldn't help. Clinton sacked Guinier the next day. She had no standing,
but a darn good political question.
84. It's a ripe but moot comity of errors.
85. The organization may be confusing, but the doctrines are becoming clearer, right?
Also, not once have I said "sua sponte," "sui generis," "quid pro quo" or "query." How
many law school professors and Supreme Court justices can make that statement? Also, I've
never had a speeding ticket. (sua speedo).
86. Help in the sense that its broad interpretation by the Supreme Court has left a
path of great latitude and hence given Congress something to occupy its time.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
88. It seems in the olden days (Constitution-drafting days) there was a "less govern-
ment is better" philosophy. In their haste to keep the states under control, the drafters of
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Here's how the Commerce Clause works: states can't regulate
anything 9 and the federal government can regulate everything.90
The Commerce Clause has produced some memorable cases.
There's Ollie's Barbecue in Katzenbach v. McClung.91 Ollie, or was
it McClung? or Katzenbach? found himself subject to the federal
Civil Rights Act because he used out-of-state meat. The Heart of
Atlanta Motel got nabbed by the feds because it permitted out-of-
state guests."2 And even the loan sharks, who used only local marks
and cut off only local thumbs as an enforcement mechanism, or for
interest payments, are subject to federal regulation, because their
cash might end up in interstate commerce.93
States haven't had much luck in regulation. If a state regulation
affects interstate commerce,94 then the state has to have a darn
good reason for regulating. 5 States have been peculiarly inept at
coming up with good legislation or good reasons. They've tried
the Constitution didn't realize it was the Feds who might get out of control.
89. It wasn't originally supposed to be that way. First, the court struggled with what
commerce actually was. See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which was
a case involving steam boats, Robert Fulton, New York and New Jersey (sounds ugly al-
ready, eh?). In Gibbons, the court found that running steamboats back and forth between
states was commerce and Congress was in charge. The definition of commerce and interstate
just kept growing from "direct and immediate effect" to "affectation," so that a teenage
employee of a Sizzler in Evansville, Indiana who coughs at the salad bar ingredients
(garbanzo beans) beneath the sneeze glass is, in fact, part of interstate commerce. This con-
clusion is reached because (a) who knows where that teenager has been; (b) the teenager
owns two "10,000 Maniacs" albums and how could that group not be involved in interstate
commerce; (c) the teenager's Doc Martens were purchased in Illinois; and (d) all garbanzos
are sua sponte interstate commerce.
90. It was not an easy battle evolving to this point. For example, there was that tense
period during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration where the Supreme Court was saying
things like furniture factories in North Carolina were local activities, FDR's child labor laws
did not apply, and that furniture sweat shops were okay by the justices. See Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). But then FDR went ballistic and said he would just appoint
more people to the Supreme Court who agreed with him and his child labor laws. It is
incomprehensible that a president would stoop so low as to appoint justices who supported
his agenda. Thank goodness we have evolved to a different standard today. (Interruption:
The author has just been reminded that evolution has not yet been completed). So, those
clever justices began discovering that just about anything you could dream up was interstate
commerce, and subject to federal regulation.
91. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
92. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
93. More likely to end up off a pier somewhere, really.
94. And as we learned earlier, what regulation wouldn't affect commerce?
95. "Darn good" means children will roam the streets aimlessly without this regula-
tion. Judging from the number of children roaming aimlessly around the country it is clear
that either: a) states haven't had much Supreme Court luck; or b) states are not bothering
with much legislation.
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train car lengths,96 rear fender mudguards,97 trailer lengths,e8 and
milk99 and cantaloupe packing. 00
Recently, the states may have hit the jackpot with toxic waste. 10'
The Supreme Court seems amenable to saying, "Hey, Commerce
Clause aside, states don't have to take the rest of the world's toxic
waste.102
B. Taxation-A Congressional Specialty
Article I would be pretty dull if all Congress was permitted to do
was slap on a few arbitrary rules here and there. Fortunately for all
96. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). This case involved the Ari-
zona Train Limit Law, which limited train length for trains crossing Arizona to 14 passen-
gers cars, or 70 freight cars. The traffic jams in New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and California
caused by pauses for the unhooking of train cars pushed Southern Pacific into court with a
lawsuit, a Commerce Clause challenge, and the following question, "What the **** differ-
ence does it make how long the trains are?"
97. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). This case involved an
Illinois statute that required all trucks operating on Illinois roads to be equipped with rear
fender mudguards. The traffic jams in Indiana, Missouri, Wisconsin and Iowa caused by
trucks stopping to put on mudguards forced Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. into court with a
lawsuit, a Commerce Clause challenge, and the following question, "What the **** differ-
ence does it make on Illinois roads if cars get a little mud on them?"
98. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), the state of
Iowa passed a statute prohibiting the use of 65-foot double trailers on Iowa highways. The
traffic jams in Kansas, South Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois and Wisconsin caused by the
pauses for unhooking of trailers and rehooking to the cabs forced Consolidated Freightways
Corp. into court with a lawsuit, a Commerce Clause challenge, and the following question,
"What the **** difference does it make how long a trailer is when it's traveling across
Iowa?"
99. The milk cases are abundant, rich in Vitamin D and do a body good. See e.g.,
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935). The Commerce Clause challenges to state regulation in each of these basically
provided the following question, "What the **** difference does it make where milk is pas-
teurized?" Pasteurization is the same in Wisconsin as it is in Illinois, West Virginia being
the only possible exception.
100. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which an Arizona regulation
required Arizona cantaloupe to be boxed in Arizona and not shipped to California for box-
ing. For a quick review quiz, fill in blanks for the question Church's lawsuit raised, "What
difference where - is
boxed?"
101. Not in the sense that toxic waste is good, but in the sense that they might make
some Commerce Clause headway with the issue. This would be because it does make a dif-
ference where and how much toxic waste is stored in Wisconsin. New Jersey will have some
difficulty with this "it does make a difference" argument, but the New Jerseyites can always
store their toxic waste in 65' trailers with mudguards.
102. Expressed more eloquently, and with a good deal more verbiage, in Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't. of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
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of us,"0 3 Article I adds Congressional entertainment through the
taxing power.1"4 Another good feature of Article I is that Congress
is also given the spending power.'0 5 States also get to tax compa-
nies that trot into or have their goods trot into their state. 01
C. Preemption or "We Were Here First"
Although you'd never guess by looing at it or by observing the
legislative process, Congress has strong feelings about areas they've
chosen to regulate. Once Congress is in there pitching, the states
are not allowed to step in and change around the Congressional
regulatory scheme.'
0 7
Here are the questions used to decide whether Congress has pre-
empted a field:
1) Who was here first?
2) Are the regulations detailed enough so that no one understands them?
3) Is your state's buffoonish, interference likely to produce traffic jams?
4) Does the federal legislation say, "States keep out. This means you too
California?"
5) Did Congress make a conscious choice for regulatory preemption? 0 '
6) Is the state just being more picky?' 09
103. Especially tax lawyers, tax (not taxing) law professors and the Big Six accounting
firms.
104. This author will not say whether Congress is entertained by it or we are enter-
tained by having Congress use it.
105. Unfortunately, nowhere in the Constitution is it required that spending match
taxing. Spending may thus exceed taxing. Not since 1913 has taxing exceeded spending.
106. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992), the Supreme Court held
that catalog sales in North Dakota accomplished solely by mail or phone could still be taxed
by North Dakota. When it was just Sears and Spiegel selling a Craftsmen belt and a blouse,
it was not a big deal. Once everyone from The Sharper Image to Victoria's Secret entered
the catalog business, the states wanted in on the deals. The Supreme Court has been much
kinder to states with their taxes than with their mudguards.
107. This rule on preemption exists because Congress would look bad if the states
stepped in and did a better job. Also, it would provide some humorous moments if regula-
tion got fragmented. See notes 96-102, in which traffic jams resulting from lengths, mud, etc.
were noted.
108. This would be as opposed to an unconscious choice, which wouldn't count for'
preemption purposes, but would not be Congressionally unusual. (Being unconscious while
legislating, that is).
109. This would be illustrated by another classic case that demonstrates state legisla-
tures have even more time on their hands than Congress. In Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), the Supreme Court said that California could require
its own minimum oil content standard for avocados even though those avocados might meet
federal standards. Thus, California was constitutionally entitled to greasier avocados than
the rest of us. So far it seems safe to conclude that Con Law means transportation, milk and
produce.
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VII. THE REST OF THE BODY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Now there's Article III, which outlines the Executive Pow-
ers-war stuff, impeachment junk, vetoes, and that one Nixon
case.11 None of this ever comes up except when we bomb Iraq and
someone on the Senate Armed Forces committee says, "I believe it
was a violation of the War Powers Clause." To which the rest of
the country responds, "So what? It's just Iraq." If the President
bombed Aspen, it might reach a constitutional showdown. But let's
assume only the best is ahead for the nation's skiing, beer, and
Amendment 2 capital, and move on to the William of Rights.
VIII. THOSE TRICKY AMENDMENTS, OR WHO WOULD HAVE
THOUGHT TEN AFTERTHOUGHTS COULD PRODUCE SO MUCH
VERBIAGE, IRRITATION AND DOWNRIGHT CRANKINESS AMONG
OTHERWISE RATIONAL PEOPLE...
A. The First Amendment- Free Exercise and Yelling Fire'
1 2
The First Amendment, through some pretty fancy language,
'1 3
says we have the right to mouth off about things." 4 Now this sim-
110. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Also see note 55
and accompanying text.
111. There's just something about the Bill of Rights that makes people want to protest
high school baccalaureate services that nobody attends anyway. There's no rational basis for
it. Or strict scrutiny for that matter. See notes 198-225.
112. This sounds like one of those weekend radio promotions where the disc jockey
would show up with a three-story inflatable beer can and bystanders would come by and yell
"Woo-EEE!" over the airways. It's mighty fine listening pleasure.
113. In the interest of my future merit reviews, I have decided to insert a substantive
footnote (it is not a substantive due process footnote, however) that offers you the actual
language of the First Amendment. This way I can point to footnote 113 and say to my
department chair, "Look at footnote 113 and tell me I'm not doing scholarly work." Here it
is (the scholarly work and the language of the First Amendment):
Congress shall make no law ... [I didn't want to get too scholarly, hence the ellipsis
leaving out junk] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Somehow I can't see the federal government as being able to redress grievances. They've
had a lot of trouble losing Mars probes and so forth.
114. Now, lately, mouthing off has experienced some politically correct (PC) con-
straints. The constraints are not politically correct. It is the mouthing off that must be
politically correct to enjoy First Amendment protection. There was that guy Eden Jacobo-
witz at the University of Pennsylvania who yelled the following out his dorm window to
quiet some partying women: "Shut up you water buffalo!" The women took offense at the
remark and claimed it was a racist slur. Having attended college, and having witnessed
noisy, partying women, I believe most of them would have welcomed "water buffalo" as
flattering given the fact that they were pretty much reduced to activities such as snorting
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ple concept has, of course, been expanded into twenty volumes of
cases because it turns out we do need some controls on mouthing
off.
1. Subversive Speech - The Problem That Ended with the
1968 Democratic Convention
Early on, the Supreme Court was testy about subversive speech
and pretty much supported tossing folks in jail when they made
speeches about conspiracy,1 " communism,' 6 draft dodging' 1 and
water buffalos."18 However, once we got to the Vietnam War, we
pretty much got over considering protesting a subversive
activity." 9
2. Fighting Words
The Supreme Court has also carved out the "fighting words" ex-
ception. 2 ' You're not allowed to say in public things that would
cause an "addressee"'' to fight.
and throwing up. However, poor Eden was brought up on racism charges. Apparently there
is a little known water buffalo exception to the First Amendment. Eventually, Sheldon
Hackney, the president of the University of Pennsylvania and Head of the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, sensed that the pummeling he was receiving from the Wall Street
Journal and Rush Limbaugh was not good for any nominee (see, e.g., Zoe Baird, Kimba
Wood and Lani Guinier). So, the charges were dropped. Penn Campus in Front Lines of PC
Warfare, ARIZONA REPUBLIc, May 16, 1993, at A17. Personally, I was disappointed. I wanted
to see the Supreme Court haggle over a case whose central focus was water buffalo.
Again, for you trivia buffs and potential Jeopardy contestants, Eden tells us that he is an
Orthodox Jew and "water buffalo" is the translation of a Yiddish epithet bohemia which is
slang for "thoughtless person." Even to me, a non-orthodox Mormon, the water buffalo has
always seemed to represent insensitivity.
115. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
116. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
117. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
118. I made this up just to see if you were paying attention. Your mother smelled of
elderberries. Just testing the First Amendment parameters as I write.
119. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). Although the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on this, we did, in fact, elect a president who protested the Vietnam War. Gennifer
Flowers seemed to create more difficulties for him than this First Amendment issue. A Su-
preme Court ruling on Gennifer Flowers and The Star would be First Amendment stuff
worth reading.
120. The "fighting words" exception came to us in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), in which Chaplinsky called the city marshal a "damned Fascist" and a
"**-damned racketeer." (I like the use of the hyphen). Now, he didn't use "water buffalo,"
but for New Hampshire them's pretty strong words.
121. Only the Supreme Court would call the fascist and racketeer an "addressee."
Sounds like someone faxed you a horrible note saying, "You're Roger Clinton's half-
brother." Note use of hyphen.
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3. Newspapers, Public Figures and Such
The Supreme Court has also dabbled in this whole newspaper
thing when newspapers report on folks who are indeed racketeers,
but the racketeers get upset because they're called that instead of
some more benign term like "addressee." This is where New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan122 comes in. Folks121 who are considered
public figures1 24 can't recover for being called a racketeer or Ma-
donna fan, even if it is false, 25 unless the public figure is able to
show that the racketeer/Madonna fan statement was made know-
ing it was false, or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or
false.
21
Now public figures have tried invasion of privacy 127 and inflic-
tion of emotional distress as other means of recovery, 2 " but the
Supreme Court seems committed to this whole notion of the pub-
lic's right to know, chilling effect and all.129
122. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Oddly enough the case involves a commissioner (Sullivan)
from Montgomery, Alabama. It seems odd that the New York Times had to go all the way
to Alabama to find wrong-doing among public officials.
123. Addressees, racketeers, and water buffalos.
124. Madonna, Prince, Burt Reynolds, Julia Roberts, Lyle Lovett (although only by
marriage), Jackie 0, Fergie and a host of others who don't have to report to some form of
work everyday and seem to have time to be photographed in Aspen, Boca Raton and Mont-
gomery, Alabama.
125. I mean really-what person could ever be established as a bona fide Madonna
fan? It seems to me, based on rumors on the big Sex book, that Madonna and the word
bona fide are presently worlds apart.
126. Personally, I believe there is reckless disregard for anything printed about the
folks listed in footnote 124. I think if the National Enquirer, which by the way, has not
been established as a bona fide newspaper, printed a story whose headline was: "Prince and
Joey Buttafuco to Adopt ET Alien," not too many of us would get worked up about it. And
only those folks who watch Regis and Kathie Lee would believe it anyway. Perhaps the
Supreme Court could adopt a new standard-the story was printed knowing that Regis and
Kathie Lee fans would believe it. Do you think David Souter knows who Regis and Kathie
Lee are?
127. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); and Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Both cases involved disclosure of identities of crime victims. Ap-
parently those who have the nerve to be victims of crimes and file police reports cannot also
retain their privacy.
128. This theory was shot down in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
This was the case in which the Rev. Jerry Falwell sued because of a parody (cousin to com-
ity, see note 80) ad in Hustler magazine (Sorry, I don't have the cite, as I'm relying on the
Supreme Court's description. BLUEBOOK aside, I do draw the line on certain forms of original
research) that showed Falwell (a nationally known televangelist) in a drunken, incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. While the Court said the speech was "outra-
geous," it was still speech, Falwell was still a public figure, and if Falwell won, political
cartoons would fall by the wayside.
129. I love it when the Supreme Court uses "chilling effect." It's the Court's way of
saying newspaper folks would read a decision in favor of a public figure and say, "Well,
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4. Obscenity and Other Prurient Interests
Once we get past the defamation cases, we move on to obscen-
ity. 130 It turns out obscenity does not always enjoy First Amend-
ment protection."' Originally, the Supreme Court said the First
Amendment protections do not extend to forms of speech "utterly
without redeeming social importance. ' 132 This standard had to be
revised, because otherwise The Brady Bunch and My Mother the
Car would have been ruled obscene and unconstitutional.
133
So, the Supreme Court established a three-part test:3
Part 1: Using contemporary community standards, does the material or
work appeal to the prurient interest?
3 5
Part 2: Does the work depict or describe in a patently offensive way sexual
conduct as defined by state law?' 36
Part 3: Does the work, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value?3 7
As a result of this three-part test, the Supreme Court has been
able to uphold state statutes prohibiting adult movies,1 3 8 child por-
nography 39 and Wheel of Fortune.4 ' Also, there are a couple of
there's no way I'm doing any more stories on Whitney Houston. She's liable to sue my socks
off and win." Actually the newspaper's lawyer would say, "No more stories on Whitney
Houston. She'll sue your socks off. Much as I'd like to work, I also would like to be em-
ployed by non-defunct newspapers." With a lot of chilling effect, we'd pretty much be re-
duced to reading The National Enquirer and watching Regis and Kathie Lee. An inside
observation: former Justice Thurgood Marshall misspelled "Enquirer" as "Inquirer" in his
recently released papers that were not supposed to be released despite instructions to the
contrary. I think we can safely conclude Justice Marshall was not a subscriber.
130. We're not going to get involved in it, we're just going to discuss the Supreme
Court's position on it.
131. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Actually this was two cases in one,
Alberts v. California was part of it too. "Obscenity enjoying" sounds backwards. Enjoying
obscenity is more like it.
132. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
133. Gilligan's Island was probably in the running as well, because as we all know, the
Skipper had a chilling effect on Mary Ann and the Professor who never did get to engage in
obscene speech or conduct.
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This author notes that, so far, California
has been responsible for all of the landmark cases on obscenity.
135. Prurient interest sounds like something stewed you would eat for breakfast, but
actually refers to animal, physical attraction!
136. It's interesting that we have to rely on state law to define sexual conduct. Or
perhaps the Supreme Court did not want to get into defining sexual conduct. They are
already struggling with defining life.
137. It's a good thing it's a three-part test because this article fails question three.
138. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Are you like me? Are you
wondering if we ever made it to Paris Adult Theatre II?
139. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Are you like me? Are you wondering, do
we really need a Supreme Court to tell us child pornography may not be in the best inter-
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combination fighting words/obscenity cases.14 1 I'll leave it to your
collective imaginations as to what is fightingly obscene or ob-
scenely fighting. Or you can look them up via footnote 146 to sat-
isfy your own prurient interests (that would be prurient, fighting
interests).'42
And the First Amendment is not violated 143 when cities don't
outlaw pornography but try and keep it in its place, preferably all
in one place. 144 This would be the First Amendment's skid row pol-
icy: zoning enabling counties and cities to confine adult theaters to
a section of town, into which only the most prurient would
venture.""
5. Radios, George Carlin and Seven or so Dirty Words
Now, the Court and the First Amendment eventually had to face
radio disc jockeys, George Carlin's seven dirty words and the
FCC.146 The Court said the FCC could regulate "obscene, indecent,
ests of children or adults? Also, I was thinking we might be able to use some of that child
labor legislation FDR slammed through (see note 90) to help out if we got bogged down in
this First Amendment stuff.
140. Okay, I got carried away here. But explain to me the redeeming social value of
adults yelling "WHEEL-OF-FORTUNE!" However, Vanna White herself has been to the
Supreme Court and won a case. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). It seems an ad showed a robot with a
blonde wig and fancy duds turning letters around. Vanna said, and the justices agreed, that
this was an appropriation of her image (that image being "blonde robot"). Are you like me?
Are you thinking, "I can't believe people get paid to write opinions about Wheel of For-
tune." Of course, I get paid for writing about people who get paid to write about Wheel of
Fortune.
141. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and also a tripartite of cases on
fighting offensive words: Rosenfeld v. New Jersey; Lewis v. City of New Orleans; Brown v.
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 901, 913, 914 (1972) (offending the BLUEBOOK with this citation format).
Are you like me? Are you thinking, "Dang, fighting offensive words are everywhere, from
New Jersey to Oklahoma!"
142. Fighting prurient interests would not work here because it would sound as if you
have been able to overcome your prurient interests. And we know that's not true because if
it were, we would be putting the Supreme Court out of work.
143. No prurient connotation here.
144. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Are you like me? Are you thinking "Play-
time Theatres" sounds like a place that would feature "Barney's Anniversary Show"?
145. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has struck down an ordinance that prohibited
showing films with nudity on drive-in screens because toddlers walking by would see it. I
was worried more about the impact (literally and figuratively) on drivers going past the
screen when the nudity showed up. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
Then-Justice Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger dissented and said since you could
show the films indoors, the ordinance would survive the First Amendment. No chilling effect
due to a ban on outdoor nudity, eh?
146. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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or profane" language because broadcasting gets into homes and to
children.
147
6. Commercial Speech: Lawyers, Pharmacists, and Dentists
Buying Ad Space in the Penny Saver
It used to be that states told lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, den-
tists and other professionals that advertising was not a good
thing.148 Then, the Supreme Court got hold of a few cases, begin-
ning with the pharmacists 49 and moving through lawyers. 5 ' The
Court said that the free flow of information in a free market was
critical and the First Amendment was there to ensure free flow. 51
7. Speech Without Saying a Word - Protection Under the
First Amendment (a.k.a. Symbolic Expression 52 )
Symbolic speech includes draft card burning,'53 armbands 15' and
147. Thus, broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment protection. And then-
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan were not happy about it. In their view, a few whiners
shouldn't rain on the parade of the rest of us who enjoy the obscene, indecent and profane.
Mixed metaphors aside, the dissent didn't have a problem with obscenity in radio broad-
casts. Wait until the first Howard Stern case makes its way to the Court. No dissent on that
one. In fact, I think new legal territory will be charted as the Court not only tosses out First
Amendment privileges for disc jockeys, but also approves capital punishment for them in
some circumstances.
148. States feared that there would be ads such as, "Been in an accident? Insurance
Company giving you the run around? Looking to recover for pain and suffering? Call Sue-A-
Sponte at 555-5555." Their fears were pretty much right on target, eh?
149. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
150. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Zauderer v. Office of Dis-
ciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); and Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
151. Of information. Not free flow of free services. Also, in this line of commercial
speech, corporations are protected as well as individuals. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Thus while corporations are not people under the Fifth
Amendment, they are under the First Amendment.
152. I have seen symbolic expression on the freeway many times and I believe it was
obscene, but I believe it has never been challenged due to mootness problems (see notes 70-
79) and the feeling that symbolic expression in the form of a hand gesture beats the heck
out of being shot as an alternative means of symbolic expression. I'm theorizing here, be-
cause no case is yet ripe, but I don't think the First Amendment covers shooting. More
accurately, a state statute that prohibits shooting drivers who cut you off on the freeway
would not be violative of First Amendment rights.
153. United States v. 0'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Sort of a moot issue now, eh?
154. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Isn't it amazing that high school kids have the time to litigate a case all the way to the
Supreme Court?
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flag burning. 155 Overall, the Supreme Court seems pretty taken
with protecting symbolic speech. 56
8. Speech in Public Places-Parades, Traffic Jams 157 and Such
We all have the right to express our views in public, but the
First Amendment does give way to things like quiet, and traffic
control.1 8' This is also where we get into the solicitation things. 159
Basically, the Court has held that we have to be annoyed by some
soliciting, because only reasonable regulation,' 60 not complete bans,
are tolerated under the First Amendment.' 61
9. The Speech Thing Gets Out of Control
Honestly, from the way folks go on, and the number of Supreme
Court decisions, you would think this speech thing was a daily re-
quirement. The Supreme Court has faced every issue from whether
protestors could sit on the Supreme Court steps, 62 to whether util-
ity poles could be used for campaign posters,' 63 to limitations on
campaign expenditures. 6 4 Basically, there are very few issues that
can't be turned into First Amendment issues.
155. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974); and Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
156. They even struck down a federal statute passed after Johnson, preventing flag
mutilation. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
157. Please recall, as noted in notes 87-102, that the Commerce Clause pretty much
boiled down to covering traffic jams as well.
158. It is fascinating to note that an amendment that has difficulty regulating obscen-
ity is tossed aside in the interest of traffic flow and noise reduction. See, e.g., Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
159. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
160. Reasonable regulation does not include the right of the solicited (similar to ad-
dressee, see note 121) to force the solicitor onto the security check point conveyer belt.
161. Thus the Hare Krishna will live on in LAX through the eternities.
162. The justices did not let the First Amendment or the protestors come home to
roost. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
163. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). It's
hard to believe, given the way downtown Los Angeles (or anywhere Los Angeles for that
matter) looks, that a campaign poster on a utility pole would get anyone worked up. I be-
lieve they should be grateful just to have utility poles still standing.
164. That tiny First Amendment went both ways on this issue in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). You can spend as much as you want independently on any candidate or issue
(just watch the telephone pole posters), but Congress can put limits on donations to
candidates.
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10. Freedom of Association - Speaking in Groups'65
Originally this part of the First Amendment seemed to be
designed to protect political association. Now it pretty much boils
down to whether women can be Elks, Moose and other animals.1 66
11. Establishment and Free Exercise (This means religious
freedom for us Constitutionally impaired types)
Here's the infamous Establishment Clause. "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... ,,,' It requires the state to be neu-
tral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers.
Free exercise boils down to this: cities can have nativity
scenes,1 68 schools can't be required to teach creation science if they
teach evolution,169 and tuition tax breaks for parochial schools are
okay.170 The most recent issue is the terrible interference of reli-
gion in public' schools in the form of prayers at graduation ceremo-
nies and baccalaureate services, which, as we all know, will lead to
the end of civilization.
1 71
165. You can even do this at malls and such. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). This area of cases
also gets into all those loyalty oath cases where teachers get worked up if they have to sign
an oath saying they won't join up with Charles Manson. I exaggerate, but teachers have
trekked to the Supreme Court a few times. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485
(1952); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); and Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964). No wonder our math scores are among the lowest worldwide. All the
teachers and students are busy at the Supreme Court (but not on the stairs, see note 162).
167. This was almost as good as footnote 113 and it is a nice touch having it in the
body of the article, eh? Oh yes, official cite: U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Of course cities can also have Santa
Claus, and as the court phrased it, "related figures." See Santa Clause, at note 24.
169. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). Heck, I'd be happy if the schools just
explained that the movie Jurassic Park is based on a novel.
170. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Can you believe some parent took the time
to bring suit against those lawless parochial school supporters?
171. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Here's where we stand: if the students or
religious folks organize a baccalaureate, it's okay by the brethren and sisters. But, if the
school district tries to force (or sneak) a prayer in sua sponte (or Catholic), then the First
Amendment takes over.
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B. The Second Amendment - So Long As There is An NRA, No
Worries Here
C. The Fourth Amendment
172
Although the Fourth Amendment is part of the Constitution,
fortunately for us and the assigned editors for this article, it is not
part of Constitutional Law. They just toss all of that into criminal
procedure.1
73
D. The Fifth Amendment
174
1. Miranda and Other Warning Signs
The Fifth Amendment is a bifurcated Amendment. 75 The crimi-
nal law section is the part that says you can't be required to spill
your guts in court even if you're guilty as sin. Part of this protec-
tion includes the Miranda warnings, which is the Supreme Court's
way of preventing you from spilling your guts before you under-
stand that you don't have to.' 76 It's important to remember this:
unless the Fox film crew's Cops cameras are rolling, persons
charged with crimes will always whine about their Fifth Amend-
ment rights.
77
172. Are you like me? Are you just sick of the First Amendment? Are you happy to be
moving along?
173. Here's all you need to know: unless evidence falls from the sky and hits you on
the head, get a warrant.
174. Are you like me? Are you just thrilled that the Fourth Amendment was summa-
rily dismissed? If, however, you are going to, or do, work for a public defender's office, you
might consider looking into the Fourth Amendment just to see if anything relevant crops
up.
175. It is one-half criminal law and one-half constitutional law.
176. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). My favorite Dragnet episode is one in
which Joe Friday and Bill Gannon catch two eight-year olds in the act of burglarizing a
chemical lab. Joe read the eight-year olds their rights and asked, "Do you understand?" The
eight-year olds then slowly but surely spilled their guts.
Thankfully, Joe saw it in his heart to recommend that the kids just be turned over to
their parents. Here's a quiz: Were the Miranda warnings in this episode flawed? Trivia bo-
nus: What chemical were the eight-year olds told to burgle? Reality check: What is a grown
law student and/or person doing watching or recalling Dragnet episodes? Do you see what
constitutional law does to your mind?
177. It's too much television and too many movies. In one of my favorite Bob Newhart
Show episodes, Bob and the Peeper are arrested (through a mix-up, of course, and a merry
one at that) for solicitation. The two female undercover officers who are new to their jobs
(lacking the rich experience of a Joe Friday) neglect to read Bob and the Peep their rights.
Bob discovers this as he's sitting in jail (he used a call to Emily as his one phone call and
Emily thought it was a Bob/Peeper usual practical joke) and demands a dismissal, which he
and the Peep are given. Quiz: Must charges be dismissed just because the Miranda warnings
are forgotten? Trivia question: Where were Bob and the Peeper headed when they were
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2. Takings Clause - There's a Freeway in Our Den
The other part of the Fifth Amendment has all kinds of names,
from the Takings Clause, to eminent domain, to just compensa-
tion, to "we need a freeway here so you're moving.
17 8
Here's the tricky part of eminent domain. Our forefathers1 7 9 did
not actually say, "you can take property when you need it." They
just said "nor shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation."1 80 So, we've just sort of implied the whole
Takings Clause.' 81 Here are the three keys to this eminent domain
thing:
a. Must be a taking for a public purpose;182
b. Must be a taking;1 83 and
c. Must be compensation."8
That's it-pretty easy, eh? If you take it, you pay. This is also a
principle of criminal law.
arrested? Bonus question: Name the three television shows Bob Newhart starred in and his
profession in each.
178. Okay, it's never been called that, but that's it for all intents and purposes (note
plural in honor of "takings").
179. I don't want to get nabbed by the PC police. However, there were no foremothers
drafting the Constitution. Granted there were supportive foremothers who tended the
homefront and offered wording changes, but they just didn't write this one, gang. However,
out of respect to revisionist historians I offer the following: There is no question there would
not have been a Constitution or Christopher Columbus if it had not been for foremothers.
180. The third real citation in 180 footnotes (see notes 113 and 167). U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
181. We've done that a lot. See, e.g., privacy and abortion, at notes 207-08.
182. The classic case here is Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984),
where Hawaii just decided it was sick of having 72 people owning 47% of Hawaii. So it just
created a system for lessees to turn leases into ownership. Not a bad deal if the court will
back you up. And it did.
183. The Court (the same Court that defined an arm band as speech) not surprisingly,
has found that flights too low over chicken coops that cause the chickens to become schizo is
a taking. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Also, preventing a landowner from
constructing a building on his land because it is a flood plain (presumably a good preventive
measure) is a taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987). And if you require a landlord to install a 4" x 2" cable TV box on his
building (presumably another good idea), it is still a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Finally, requiring folks who own beachfront prop-
erty to allow beachgoers to trot across their property is also a taking. Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Also, although the Supreme Court did not specifically
state this, it is a darn scary thought to have California beachgoers anywhere near your prop-
erty. I believe it affects your IQ. I saw that on Sightings once.
184. Cash, bucks, dinero, moola.
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E. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment is a two-part amendment, too. Half of it
is covered in criminal procedure, where you learn that every person
charged with a crime' 85 has a right to a trial before a jury com-
prised of the unemployed, or those too stupid to get out of jury
duty. 8 ' The other half is covered in civil procedure, where you
learn that every person who brings a civil suit for over $25 is enti-
tled to a trial before a jury composed of the unemployed, those too
stupid to get out of jury duty, and those who were dismissed for
cause earlier in the day by the criminal trial docket.
F. The Fourteenth Amendment: If You Think the Court Got
Carried Away on the First Amendment Wait Until You Get a
Load of This
The Fourteenth Amendment says several things: 1) The Bill of
Rights applies to the states;81  2) We all get due process in hear-
ings; 88 3) We all can't have our rights taken away by that evil end-
run known as substantive due process;' 89  and 4) equal
protection. 9 '
1. Due Process - The Hearing Clause
To use our -forefathers' language, you can't be deprived of "life,
liberty or property" without due process of law.' 9' Property rights
185. I was going to say "criminal" but I'd have a tough time finagling my way out of
that when I get to due process.
186. Just an aside - How come I'm never chosen for jury duty? The lawyers ask me
one or two questions to which I respond, "I think the death penalty is appropriate for
speeding," or "I believe most personal injury claimants are like Jack Lemmon in The For-
tune Cookie." I am summarily dismissed and referred for psychiatric help. Did you see The
Fortune Cookie? Trivia question: What was Jack Lemmon's occupation in it?
187. I believe you probably figured this after facing all those First Amendment cases
where states were trying to control movies like DEBBIE DOEs DALLAS and where they're
shown. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
188. You know, are they taking something away? If so, you get a hearing. Not necessa-
rily a stellar jury like in note 186, but a nice hearing nonetheless.
189. Although it sounds benign, substantive due process was the issue in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) - a gruesome case in which Oklahoma by statute was order-
ing mandatory sterilization of felonious habitual criminals. Talk about taking something
away!
190. Where Title VII meets the Constitution and it's not a pretty sight.
191. This part is also studied in criminal law. It means juries are required in state
criminal trials as well.
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have included things like welfare benefits,1 92 having your utilities
turned off,193 retaining your driver's license'9 4 and firing of public
employees. 95 So, due process pretty much consists of challenges by
people who are unemployed, and unable to drive, but who are sit-
ting around in the dark fretting about welfare. 196 The type of hear-
ing required depends on how much you have to lose, and how
much the government can afford to spend on your hearing.
97
2. Substantive Due Process - Taking Rights Away in the Dark
of Night 9 '
Now, regular old due process can't deprive you of life, liberty or
property without a hearing. But substantive due process covers a
lot of made-up rights. 99
a. Family Rights, Privacy and Personal Autonomy
This all started with the notion that marriage and the bearing
and raising of children ought to be personal choices, not subject to
government regulation.2 00 Hence we began a trot down the lanes of
birth control, 0' abortion, 0 2 the right to marry, 0 3 the right to com-
192. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
193. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
194. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535"(1971).
195. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). I crafted together this
credible list of footnotes 192-195, and I'll point to them and notes 113 and 167 as evidence
of scholarly work.
196. And thank goodness due process is around for these folks.
197. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Hey, due process is important but
we're not going to get carried away spending a lot of money on it.
198. Or in the confusion of a legislative session. Either way it is not going to be wit-
nessed by a lot of folks, including some of the representatives.
199. Well, the rights themselves weren't made up. Rather, they aren't specifically
listed in the 14th Amendment, but the Court decided to imply that they were there and has
been running with them ever since.
200. Having borne and partially raised three children, I believe the Supreme Court is
out to lunch on this. There are times in my home when I could use government intervention.
I was thinking that having the police in for a warrantless search (see notes 172-173) around
about bed time would be a big help in the eternal parental quest to have children retire in
the evening without the use of hand-grenades.
201. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
202. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791 (1992). Now, if you think we have this topic straightened around, check out the follow-
ing chart on how these decisions got pieced (literally) together. Good luck, Justice Ginsburg.
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mit children, 20" and the right to die.2 05 Now it's important to un-
derstand that the Supreme Court has different tests for different
rights under substantive due process. All the statutes must satisfy
the rational basis test which means the laws are reasonable and
non-arbitrary.2 °0 However, some substantive due process challenges
require that the challenged statute survive a strict scrutiny test,
such as in privacy areas,207 which means the state has to show it
has a compelling interest in regulating the area20 8 and that the
Webster v.
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Source: MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, BUSINESS AND ITS LEGAL, ETHICAL AND GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT 47 (1994). As hard as it may be for the reader to grasp, the author has a textbook that
has performed fairly well. It's no Gunther, but it pays for gas.
203. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). In this case, Wisconsin tried to make
being current on your child support obligations from your old marriage(s) a prerequisite for
getting a marriage license. Not a bad idea, but the Court didn't take to the notion. Remar-
riage is not a collection device.
204. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). There may be hope for me. See note 200.
205. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
206. In constitutional law, they always act as if this is the easiest test to satisfy. How-
ever, think of some of your own state legislators. For me it is rare that the words rational or
reasonable come to mind when I think of any of my legislators. After all, in Arizona, these
are the people who had difficulty impeaching a governor who still used the term "picka-
ninny" and then labeled it a term of endearment.
207. All those familiar things I listed before. See notes 200-205.
208.. It would seem that the.Wisconsin statute was one in which legislators were say-
ing, "Hey, I'll tell you a good way to get that child support current; cut off future mar-
riages." It's a good idea but apparently child support is not compelling. Marriage is compel-
ling. Offspring are not. Also, add "compelling" to your constitutional wonk vocabulary.
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statute is drawn to only address that compelling interest. 20 9 We
can therefore conclude that no statute can survive 14th Amend-
ment scrutiny unless it has due substance.2 1
3. Equal Protection-Hey, There's Very Little That Won't
Work Here
21 1
Now, to begin with, equal protection is layered. Depending on
what's being regulated, the Court could use a rational basis test,21 2
an intermediate scrutiny test 2 13 or a strict scrutiny test.214 But it
gets better. Even if you show215 that your statute addresses an evil
that will prevent the end of civilization, you still have to show your
statute is designed only to curb the evil mongers in your state.
Now, try to understand the layers by following this excerpt from a
Legalines Con Law outline:
TYPES OF CLASSIFICATION. If Z represents the evil being pro-
scribed, ///// represent people who threaten the evil, and xxxxx represent
people who do not threaten the evil, then the following types of classifica-
tions are possible:
1) / All persons threatening the evil are legislated against.
2) m //// Here the statute covers none of those who threaten
the evil.
209. This is where the anti-abortion statutes come in and things like husband consent
are broader than necessary for the compelling state interest in protection of life. Are you
like me? Do you wish abortion issues could be transferred out of constitutional law? Family
law would be a good place; there's not enough course material there anyway.
210. Are you like me? Are you thinking rational, smational, compelling, smelling.
There are 362 law professors, Planned Parenthood, most of Hollywood, and protestors with
Scud missiles who need to work this out, compelling rationality aside.
211. I saved the best for last. Equal protection is where I throw in the towel and say,
"I'm never going to use this because I have no compelling need for rational, but strict sub-
stance and scrutiny in my life."
212. The Court basically abandoned rational basis years ago. Some of you are saying,
"No kidding. Rational was dropped from the Supreme Court's vocabulary during the War-
ren years."
213. The gender cases go here, and there must be a substantial government interest or
objective, and there must be substantial relationship between the gender classification and
achievement of the state's objective. Translation: if you exclude women, you better have an
awfully good reason.
214. Strict scrutiny means the law will be struck down. The recent gerrymandering
case on minority districts, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), was a race-based classifica-
tion that bit the dust under strict scrutiny. You think states would catch on to the whole
strict scrutiny thing and forget race-based laws, gender-based laws and fruit-based punch.
215. "You" being the state presumably defending a law that is meeting its 14th
Amendment match.
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3) FT" // Here the statute covers only a few. This is
underinclusive classification.
4) This is an overinclusive classification. The courts arejXX loath to uphold these types of laws since they affect
innocent persons.
5) flmrJ This type of statute is both under- and over-
5) L..IAI inclusive.21 6
I'll help you out by listing the suspect classifications. If a statute
is based on any of these factors, it is already suspect and subject to
strict scrutiny:217  race,2 18 racial segregation,219  gender,220  alien-
age,22 1 illegitimacy,222 and affirmative action.223 We're not sure on
mental illness and mental retardation because the court has
dodged them twice.22'
But here's the bottom line on all this Fourteenth Amendment
stuff - if a statute picks on one group it will be taken to the Su-
preme Court by either the pickees or the other side. 226 There's also
216. Are you like me? Are you saying: "This is too hard to think about. Let's just see if
we can talk the state into surrendering?" Chart from Constitutional Law by Legalines, p.
139.
217. Translation: The statute is biting the dust.
218. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
219. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Hey, now Plessy v. Ferguson is a famous
one that everyone throws around in con law and in hifalootin' conversations. This was a case
in which a state law required separate railway cars for black citizens and white citizens. In
1896, the statute survived, but we didn't have strict scrutiny in those days and we were
basically nuts. We finally moved to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where the
Court, even without any scrutiny, held that we were nuts, and separate was not equal.
220. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Prior to this decision, gender was
not a suspect classification. There were still separate and unequal jobs for women and men.
However, there is Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), in which a California
rapist challenged California's statutory rape law on 14th Amendment grounds because it
only applied to men. Women could not be prosecuted for statutory rape (is this really a big
problem?). However, even with strict scrutiny, the statute survived because its purpose was
to prevent illegitimate pregnancy - granted, not a big problem for male statutory rape
victims. Basically, the Court used those boxes and such in the figure, noted at note 216, and
found the evil mongers were properly addressed.
221. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). No denying welfare benefits to aliens.
222. Actually, I'm not really sure about the level of scrutiny here, but neither is the
Court. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
223. This is actually race/gender classification but I have always wanted to cite Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
224. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); and Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Court has dodged the issues twice; this author does
not mean to imply that the collective Court was in anyway threatened by mental
deficiencies.
225. Depending of course on whether the statute helps or hurts the pickees or the
other side. Like the California case where the guy challenged the statutory rape gender
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a good chance the Supreme Court, using Due Process and the
Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny rational substantive re-
view,22a will find the state has goofed up again. I think that some-
day the Supreme Court should hold a contest to see which state
can pass legislation based on a suspect classification and have it
survive strict scrutiny.22 7 My money's on Pennsylvania, since it got
five out of six of the elements in its abortion law approved. If it
sounds like I'm introducing parimutuel betting into Supreme
Court analysis, you're correct. But I'm limiting it strictly and ra-
tionally to Fourteenth Amendment cases.
IX. CONCLUSION
Well, there it is, from the Nixon papers to birth control to ra-
tional speech. You're never going to doubt your Constitutional IQ
again. You're going to go around saying things like "Plessy v. Fer-
guson," "strict scrutiny" and "free exercise," and assuming you're
not picked up and committed, you'll be fine. If you are picked up
and commitment proceedings are started, think Fourteenth
Amendment due process, suspect classification and start burning
flags. Dazzle them with your constitutional savvy and insist on a
jury of the constitutionally impaired.
22 8
limitation. It seems unlikely that women (the other group/side) would go to the Supreme
Court and say, "We're parking on the steps until you tell us we have an equal chance to be
convicted of statutory rape." As I write this, though, it doesn't seem as far-fetched as I
thought when I conceived it as a bizarre example. Also, see the Supreme Court's sensitivity
about its steps, First Amendment or not, at note 162.
226. I don't imply the Court would review or inhale drugs here.
227. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
228. Most likely found in Illinois and Iowa along with mudguards and very long
trucks.
2281/2. Answers to quizzes and trivia bonuses:
FN176. No flawed warnings here but, since the kids were released to parents, no harm
done. I forget the chemical. Dragnet is not an obsession, just a hobby.
FN177. No, charges don't have to be dismissed, but script called for Bob and the Peep
to get home, so they were. Bob and Peeper were in a bar on their way to a Loyola game. The
Bob Newhart Show-psychologist. Newhart-innkeeper and writer. Bob-comedy writer.
FN186. Jack Lemmon was a camera man.
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